What is the psychological basis of moral cognition? Philosophical metaethics has traditionally addressed this question by operating within a fairly constrained set of options: sentimentalists hold that moral judgment is based, in some sense, on emotion; rationalists insist that moral judgment is based, in some sense, on reason. But recent developments in cognitive science and empirically informed metaethics have started to reject this narrow logical landscape, looking instead at the complex interaction between affective and deliberative processes and the role such interaction plays in moral cognition. Increasingly, empirical and philosophical psychology of moral judgment thus reorient their focus towards issues of moral learning and development.

In this course, we will discuss cutting edge developments in the recent cognitive science of moral judgment, and ask whether and how novel findings can shed light on questions of philosophical interest: what kind of capacities are relevant for moral agency? How does moral judgment work? Can we rely on moral intuition? Can people be convinced to change their moral beliefs via reasoning? Do they update their moral judgment in light of new information? We will address these and many other questions and suggest possible answers to them.