The Arab-Israeli conflict is an intractable and dangerous conflict, one that has remained impervious to generations of politicians’ and conflict experts’ attempts at resolution. The United States has acted as a guardian of Israel, but also as the leading mediator in the peace process.

This course examines the geo-strategic significance of the Middle East in an age of globalism, as well as the opportunities and limitations that this macro-dimension places on finding a workable “roadmap to peace.” We study the painful consequences of the wars and intifadas that have hardened resistance, precipitated revenge-seeking, and entrenched negative views of the identities of ‘the other.’

In addition to wars, the Arab-Israeli conflict has been fought through historical narratives that necessarily shape the lens through which we view the conflict. Therefore, the course reviews the historical debate over the establishment of Israel. We then examine the arguments, sources and methods that inform the debate on the origins and developments of the conflict. Subsequently, we address core issues and themes that in addition to the recognition of narratives, will prepare us for the simulation exercise, where we live the conflict for one weekend.

Format
Students lead 1 seminar session. In preparation for the simulation exercise students are required to hand in a team profile, a role profile and a strategy paper.

Students hand in a draft of this paper which will be peer reviewed in class. For this paper, students read about 500-600 pages, partly from the course materials, and partly from additional research

The seminars culminate in an obligatory simulation weekend. This simulation exercise on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict probes possible new directions for movement away from violence toward peace.

What happens in class is an essential part of the course. Students should be present and participate in all sessions. If a student is unable to attend class they must inform the instructor beforehand. If a student misses more than 4 sessions they will not receive credit for the course.

It is recommended to take note of the following, in preparation for the simulation game :
- Stanley Kubrick, dir. Dr Strangelove: Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb (1963)
-  Hans J. Morgenthau, ‘The Four Paradoxes of Nuclear Strategy’, The American Political Science Review 58 (1964): 23-35
- Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960)
- Timothy W. Crawford, Pivotal Deterrence: Third-Party Statecraft and the Pursuit of Peace.
- Edward Luttwak, Give War A Chance, Foreign Affairs (1999).